Ewing v. State, Dept. of Transp. Respondent\u27s Brief 1 Dckt. 34541 by unknown
UIdaho Law
Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law
Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs
3-20-2008
Ewing v. State, Dept. of Transp. Respondent's Brief 1
Dckt. 34541
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/
idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs
This Court Document is brought to you for free and open access by Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Idaho
Supreme Court Records & Briefs by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. For more information, please contact
annablaine@uidaho.edu.
Recommended Citation
"Ewing v. State, Dept. of Transp. Respondent's Brief 1 Dckt. 34541" (2008). Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs. 1668.
https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs/1668
((c·~ fer"_:~, f r)\~\/1 l\ '-->; . )' r-~ ( ,._-;> ,/ LJ lJ 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 










Supreme Court Docket No. 34541 
Kootenai County Case No. CV 06-7599 Plaintiffs-Appellants-Cross Respondents, 
V. 




MAR 2 o 2008 
_______________ ) Su,reme wurt _Court of APJll21• 
Entered on ATS by:_ -
RESPONDENT/CROSS-APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT FOR 
KOOTENAI COUNTY 
HONORABLE CHARLES W. HOSACK, PRESIDING 
Michael J. Verbillis, P.A. 
601 E. Sherman Avenue, Suite 3 
Post Office Box 519 
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83816-0519 
Attorneys for Appellants John E. Ewing and 
Noreen Ewing 
Michael E. Kelly 
Lopez & Kelly, PLLC 
1100 Key Financial Center 
702 W. Idaho Street 
Post Office Box 856 
Boise, ID 83701 
Attorneys for Respondent/Cross-Appellant 
State of Idaho, Department of Transportation 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 




Nature of the Case .................................................. 3 
Course of the Proceedings ........................................... 3 
Statement of Facts ................................................. 4 
II. ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL/CROSS-APPEAL ......................... 6 
A. Issue on Appeal ................................................... 6 
B. Issue on Cross-Appeal .............................................. 6 
Ill. ARGUMENT ........................................................... 6 
A. District Court properly ruled the State was entitled to summary 
judgment under the Idaho recreational use statute ......................... 6 
B. Notwithstanding the trial court's ruling in regard to Idaho Code§ 36-1604, 
the court erred in denying the State's Motion for Summary Judgment 
holding that the State was not Ewing's statutory employer at the time of 
the accident at issue ............................................... 13 
IV. CONCLUSION ........................................................ 20 
RESPONDENT'S BRJEF 1 
TABLE OF CASES AND AUTHORITIES 
Fuhriman v. State, Department of Transportation 
143Idaho800,802,803, 153P.3d480,482,483,485(2007) ............ 6, 14, 16, 17, 18, 19 
Bauer v. Minidoka School District No. 331 
116 Idaho 586,588, 778 P.2d 336,338 (1989) ................................. 8, 11, 12 
Jacobsen v. City of Rathdrum 
115 Idaho 266,270,273, 766 P.2d 736, 740, 743 (1988) ...................... 9, 10, 11, 12 
Johnson v. Sunshine Mining Co., Inc. 
106 Idaho 866,868,684 P.2d 268,270 (1984) ................................... 10, 12 
Tomich v. City of Pocatello 
127 Idaho 394,901 P.2d 501 (1995) . . . . .. . . .. . .. . . .. .. . . .................... 11, 12 
Venters v. Sorrento Delaware, Inc. 
141 Idaho 245,249,250,180 P.3d 392,396,398 (2005) .................. 14, 15, 16, 17, 18 
Robison v. Bateman-Hall, Inc. 
139Idaho207,210-211, 76P.3d951,954-955(2003) .................... 14, 15, 16, 17, 19 
Struhs v. Protection Technologies, Inc. 
133 Idaho 715,720,992 P.2d 164, 169 (1999) ................................... 17, 18 
Statutes 
Idaho Code§ 36-1604 ...................................... 4, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 12, 13, 20 
Idaho Code§ 72-223 .............................................. 13, 14, 15, 17, 19 
Idaho Code § 72-201 .......................................................... 14 
Idaho Code § 72-209 .......................................................... 14 
Idaho Code§ 72-211 .......................................................... 14 
Idaho Code§ 72-216 ....................................................... 14, 16 
Idaho Code§ 72-301 ....................................................... 14, 16 
Idaho Code§ 72-102 .......................................................... 15 
Idaho Code§ 72-2-102 ........................................................ 15 
IDJI 225 (I 985) .............................................................. 15 
RESPONDENT'S BRlEF 2 
I. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case. 
This appeal is brought by Plaintiffs/ Appellants John E. Ewing and Noreen Ewing against the 
State of Idaho, Department of Transportation (hereinafter "State") arising out of an action brought 
to recover damages purportedly sustained as a result of Jolm E. Ewing's (hereinafter "Ewing") fall 
at the Mineral Mountain Rest Area located on U. S. Highway 95, near Potlatch, Idaho. In their 
Complaint, it is alleged that Ewing fell into an improperly backfilled area that was not compacted. 
It was later determined the area of the fall was compromised as a result of an undetected waterline 
leak following excavation work done by Department of Transportation employees at the rest area. 
B. Course of the Proceedings. 
Ewing's Complaint for negligence against the State was filed on October 12, 2006. R. pp. 
9-10. On November 9, 2006, a Notice of Appearance was filed on behalf of the State, R. p. I 1, and 
an Answer and Demand for Jury Trial was subsequently filed on November 20, 2006. R. pp. 14-17. 
On April 10, 2007, Ewing filed a Partial Motion for Summary Judgment. Ewing's Motion 
sought an order from the court that the State, pursuant to the third affirmative defense in its Answer, 
was not Ewing's statutory employer precluding it from civil liability under the exclusive remedy 
provisions ofldaho Worker's Compensation laws. R. pp. 26-27. 
On June 25, 2007, the State filed a Cross Motion for Summary Judgment seeking an order 
from the Court that the State was Ewing's statutory employer at the time of his accident and thus, 
immune from third party liability; in the alternative, that the State did not owe a duty to Ewing as 
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a licensee on the property; and in the alternative, that the State was otherwise protected from 
liability under the provisions of Idaho Code § 36-1604, commonly known as the recreational use 
statute. R. pp. 55-56. 
Subsequent to oral argument, the District Court issued an Order denying Plaintiffs' Motion 
for Partial Summary Judgment, denying the State's Motion that it was Ewing's statutory employer 
and denying the State's Motion that Ewing was a licensee, but granting State's Motion for Summary 
Judgment under the recreational use statute. R. pp. 104-105. 
C. Statement of Facts 
The statement of facts set forth in Ewing's Brief(III. Statement of Case, (iii), Appellants' 
Brief, p. 1) is a fair summary of some of the undisputed facts in this action. Ewing's characterization 
of the location of the incident at issue and whether it was covered by the contracts at issue between 
the State and the Scarsella Brothers (Scarsella) and between Scarsella and Ewing's employer, North 
Star Enterprises, Inc. (North Star) is somewhat restrained however. 
The following facts are likewise undisputed and are pertinent to the issues on appeal and 
cross-appeal: 
I. On or about October 15, 2003, !TD awarded Contract No. 6674 to Scarsella "for the 
work ofreconstruction & minor realignment of 6.434 miles ofUS-95, MP 366.593 to MP 373.027, 
including right turn lanes, a left turn lane, truck climbing lanes, snow plow turnarounds, crossdrains, 
livestock passes, pavement marking, & signing; Electrical Substation to Smith Creek, known as 
Idaho Federal Aid Project No. NH-STP-4110(110), in Latah and Benewah County, Key No. 6298" 
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(hereinafter "ITD Contract"). R. pp. 64-70. 
2. On or about January 27, 2004, Scarsella subcontracted with North Star to perform 
certain portions of the ITD Contract including pilot car and flagging operations (hereinafter "the 
subcontract"). R. pp. 71-87. 
3. On the date of his accident, June 20, 2006, Ewing was an employee ofNorth Star, 
working on the ITD Contract as a pilot car operator and flagger. R. pp. 24-25. 
4. The Mineral Mountain Rest Area is located ator about mile post 371 which is within 
the construction zone covered by the ITD Contract and is specifically referred to in the contract as 
follows: 
Mineral Mountain Rest Area 
Mineral Mountain Rest Area is a public roadside rest facility located within the project 
limits. The Contractor shall maintain public access to the rest area at all times. The 
rest area is intended for use by the traveling public only. The Contractor shall not use 
the rest area for equipment parking nor material storage during construction. The 
Contractor shall not allow any of his employee's [sic] nor Subcontractor's employee's 
[sic] to park private vehicles within the rest area limits. The Contractor shall furnish 
separate toilet facilities for constructions workers. Any material tracked into the rest 
area from the project shall be removed by the Contractor at no additional cost to the 
State. 
R. p. 89. 
5. On June 20, 2006, while on a brealc but during the course and scope of his 
employment with North Star on the ITD Contract, as the Plaintiff walked across the Mineral 
Mountain Rest Area, the ground gave way causing him to fall. R. p. 24. 
6. Plaintiff fell while he was walking across the rest area to use a picnic table. R. p. 24. 
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7. As a result of his fall, the Plaintiff filed for and received worker's compensation 
benefits. R. pp. 93-94. 
II. 
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL/CROSS-APPEAL 
A. Issue on appeal. 
Whether the District Court erred in granting summary judgment to the State pursuant to the 
provisions ofldaho Code§ 36-1604. 
B. Issue on cross appeal. 
Whether the District Court erred in denying the State's Motion for Summary Judgment that 




A. District Court properly ruled the State was entitled to summary judgment under the 
Idaho recreational use statute. 
An appellate court's review of a lower court's ruling on a motion for summary judgment is 
under the same standard used by the trial court in originally ruling on the motion. Thereby, if the 
evidence reveals no disputed issues of material fact, what remains is a question of law, over which 
this Court exercises free review. Fuhriman v. State, Department of Transportation, 143 Ida110 800, 
at 803, 153 P.3d 480, at 483 (2007). 
In granting summary judgment to the State, the lower court ruled: 
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Idaho Code§ 36-1604, commonly referred to as the "recreational use statute," 
applies to the Mineral Mountain Rest Area where the accident at issue occurred and 
the State, as the landowner, is protected from liability by virtue of the recreational use 
statute. (Appellate Brief, p. 4, R. p. 105). 
The pertinent provisions ofidaho Code § 36-1604 to this appeal are as follows: 
36-1604. LIMITATION OF LIABILITY OF LANDOWNER. 
(a) Statement of Purpose. 
The purpose of this section is to encourage owners of land to make 
land, airstrips and water areas available to the public without charge 
for recreational purposes by limiting their liability toward persons 
entering thereon for such purposes. 
(b) Definitions. As used in this section: 
2. "Land" means private or public land ... 
4. "Recreational purposes" includes, but is not limited to, any of the 
following activities or any combination thereof: hunting, fishing, 
swimming, boating, rafting, tubing, camping, picnicking, hiking, 
pleasure driving, the flying of aircraft, bicycling, running, playing on 
playground equipment, skateboarding, athletic competition, nature 
study, water skiing, animal riding, motorcycling, snowmobiling, 
recreational vehicles, winter sports, and viewing or enjoying 
historical, archeological, scenic, geological or scientific sites, when 
done without charge of the owner. 
( c) Owner Exempt from Warning. An owner of land owes no duty of care to 
keep the premises safe for entry by others for recreational purposes, or to give any 
warning of a dangerous condition, use, structure, or activity on such premises to 
persons entering for such purposes. Neither the installation of a sign or other form 
of warning of a dangerous condition, use, structure, or activity, nor any modification 
made for the purpose of improving the safety of others, nor the failure to maintain or 
keep in place any sign, other form of warning, or modification made to improve 
safety, shall create liability on the part of an owner ofland where there is no other 
basis for such liability. 
( d) Owner Assumes No Liability. An owner ofland or equipment who either 
directly or indirectly invites or permits without charge any person to use such 
property for recreational purposes does not thereby: 
1. Extend any assurance that the premises are safe for any purpose. 
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2. Confer upon such person the legal status of an invitee or licensee to whom 
a duty of care is owed. 
Under this statute, a person who enters land, public or private, for recreational purposes is 
neither an invitee or a licensee, and thus then is not owed a duty of care beyond that of the duty owed 
to a trespasser, as will be discussed below. The statute expressly states, "an owner ofland owes no 
duty of care to keep the premises safe for entry by others for recreational purposes, or to give any 
warning of a dangerous condition .... " Idaho Code§ 36-1604(c). 
Undisputedly, the Mineral Mountain Rest Area where the Plaintiff fell is open to the public. 
In Bauer v. Minidoka School District No. 331, l 16 Idaho 586, 778 P.2d 336 (1989), this Court 
acknowledged that the recreational use statute applies to injuries occurring on public land. id. 116 
Idaho at 588, 778 P.2d at 338. Fmiher, there is no dispute of material fact that the Mineral Mountain 
Rest Area is land open to the public without charge by its owner, the State of Idaho. 
It is also undisputed that the Plaintiff has affirmed that he was walking to use a picnic table 
at the Mineral Mountain Rest Area when he suffered his alleged injuries. R. p. 24. The recreational 
use statute lists many possible uses that would be considered recreational in purpose, including 
"picnicking," when done without charge of the owner." Idaho Code§ 36-1604(b)(4). 
Appellants argue that the favorable inference to Ewing regarding the use of the Mineral 
Mountain Rest Area was that he was taking a brief rest during his work day when he fell into ground 
that suddenly gave way on the property. (Appellants' Brief, p. 4 ). An inference the Appellants claim 
the lower court did not grant. It appears however that is exactly the inference the trial court granted 
in this matter. Ewing's counsel characterizes his activity at the rest area as "taking a briefrest." id., 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 8 
p. 4. Ewing himself states he was attempting to walk to use a picnic table at the rest area. R. p. 24. 
Taking these undisputed statements in the light most favorable to the Plaintiffs, the trial court could 
not infer anything other than that Ewing was in the process of recreating at the time of the accident. 
No matter how characterized, Ewing's activity at the rest area unequivocally falls under the purview 
ofldaho Code§ 36-1604(b)(4) as a "recreational purpose." 
In an attempt to over-dissect the trial court's decision to grant summary judgment under the 
recreational use statute, the Appellants discuss the fact that the court apparently focused on the 
nature of the property rather than the character of the use of the property in its analysis. Appellants 
state that it appears the trial court reasoned that the owner of any type of public land where any of 
the activities listed in I. C. § 36-1604 could thereon be performed was entitled to this "mantel of 
invulnerability." (Appellants' Brief, pp. 4-5). This appears to be an apparent attempt to direct this 
Court toward a tortured analysis of the legislative intent of the statute. Nevertheless, Appellants 
never attempt to tie this analysis into why Mr. Ewing's incident at the Mineral Mountain Rest Area 
is not subject to the provisions of the Idaho recreational use statute. 
The Appellants' second argument addresses whether Mr. Ewing's use of the property in 
question was indeed recreational, while more on point, likewise fails. It appears Ewing is making 
the same argument made in Jacobsen v. City of Rathdrum, 115 Idaho 266, 766 P.2d 736 (1988). In 
Jacobsen, specific to Ewing's argument in this case, the mother of the injured minor plaintiff argued 
that the recreational use statute requires an intent to use land for recreational purposes and thus, 
raised the question of whether the minor could have formed the requisite intent. This Court held that 
the recreational use statute requires only that the recreational user use the owner's property for 
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recreational purposes. The statute does not require that the recreational user formulate a specific 
intent to use the property for recreational purposes. Thus, if the person actually uses the property 
for recreational purposes, no showing of specific intent to do so is required. Jacobsen, 115 Idaho 
266, at 273, 766 P.2d 736, at 743. 
While not specifically addressed in their Brief, Appellants also appeared to imply that the 
activity Ewing was engaged in when he fell needs to be specifically itemized in the language of the 
statute for the recreational use statute to apply. Thereby, Ewing's use of the property, i.e. walking 
across the property to a picnic table while on break from his job, would need to be listed with 
particularity in the statute in order for it to apply. Whether Appellants are implying this argument 
or not, this Court in Johnson v. Sunshine Mining Co., Inc., 106 Idaho 866, 684 P.2d 268 (1984), has 
addressed the scope of "recreational purposes" under Idaho Code § 36-1604. 
This Court held that I. C. § 36- l 604(b )(3) has been clearly addressed by the legislature. In 
Johnson, the Court stated that the statutory language employed by the legislature, i.e. "includes, but 
not limited to," makes it clears that the list is not intended to be exhaustive. Id., I 06 Idaho at 868, 
684 P.2d at 270. As referenced above, by his own affidavit, Ewing states he was injured while 
"attempting to walk to use the picnic table." R. p. 24. Likewise their brief clearly stated that 
Ewing's use of the property at issue was while he was taking a brief rest during his work day. 
(Appellants' Brief, p. 4). 
Appellants argue under Jacobsen v. City of Rathdrum, supra, a plaintiff may bring an action 
for willful and wanton misconduct under I. C. § 36-1604 against the owner of the land. In Jacobsen, 
this Court held "willful and wanton misconduct" is defined by the Idaho Jury Instructions as follows: 
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WILLFUL AND WANTON MISCONDUCT 
Willful and wanton misconduct is present if the defendant intentionally does 
or fails to do an act, knowing or having a reason to know facts which would lead a 
reasonable man to realize that his conduct not only creates umeasonable risk of harm 
to another, but involves a high degree of probability that such harm would result. 
IDJI 225 (1985). Jacobsen, 115 Idaho 266, at 270, 766 P.2d 736, at 740. 
In this matter, the record is devoid of any proof of willful and wanton misconduct on the part 
of the Department of Transportation employees in backfilling the area on which the Plaintiff fell or 
in knowing there was a water leak causing the area to become unstable. Further, Plaintiffs' 
Complaint Jacks even a hint of an alJegation of willful and wanton misconduct on the part of the 
State for this incident. R. pp. 9-10. Even if inferences were made in the light most favorable to the 
Appellants, those inferences do not lead to an issue of material fact that the State's acts or omissions 
in this matter may have been willful and wanton. 
Ewing also argues that this Court has fashioned exemptions to the recreational use statute 
where a "special relationship" exists between the plaintiff and the landowner. In their Brief, 
Appellants cite to Bauer v. Minidoka School District No. 331, 116 Idaho 586, 778 P.2d 336 (1989), 
discussed supra, in which the Court found that the statute did not apply because there was a special 
relationship between the defendant school district and the plaintiff student. Ewing also pointed to 
Tomich v. City of Pocatello, 127 Idaho 394, 901 P.2d 501 (1995), in which the Court ruled that the 
recreational use statute did not apply because there was a special relationship between the City as 
the owner of the airport and the plaintiff as a pilot utilizing the services offered at the airport run by 
the City of Pocatello. Despite citing to the above-referenced cases and the "special relationship" 
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exemption under the recreational use statute, Ewing fails to present any argument that he had some 
type of"special relationship" with the State at the time of his fall which would exempt him from the 
application of I. C. § 36-1604. 
Finally, Plaintiffs argue that the trial court's ruling under the recreational use statute should 
be reversed as it does not pass muster under the standards of statutory construction. It appears 
however the argument is merely a repetitive characterization of Ewing's activity at the time of this 
incident. This argument was addressed above in Johnson v. Sunshine Mining Co., Inc., 106 Idaho 
866, 684 P.2d 268. As the Court stated in Johnson, the definition of"recreational purposes" is not 
limited to the specific activities outlined in I. C. § 36-1604(b)(4). Id., 106 Idaho at 868,684 P.2d 
at 270. 
Nevertheless, this Court has looked at the recreational use statute's legislative history in 
Jacobsen v. City of Rathdrum, Bauer v. Minidoka School District No. 331 and Tomich v. City of 
Pocatello. It has deemed the statnte unambiguous and it has likewise passed due process challenges. 
Appellants' statutory construction argument presents no new areas ofinquiry which would cause this 
Court to question the lower court's ruling on a statutory construction basis. 
Notwithstanding the fact that Ewing was engaged in his employment with North Star on the 
day of his fall, he was on a break from his duties and in his own words, walking to a nearby picnic 
table at the Mineral Mountain Rest Area when he was injured. He was on public land owned by the 
State ofidaho and utilizing that land free of charge at the time of his incident. In tum, he was clearly 
utilizing the rest area as contemplated by the legislature under the language of the recreational use 
statute. 
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Based on the foregoing, Ewing's activities at the time of his alleged injuries are subject to 
Idaho Code § 36-1604 and as such, the trial court properly granted the State's Motion for Summary 
Judgment. 
B. Notwithstanding the trial court's ruling in regard to Idaho Code§ 36-1604, the court 
erred in denying the State's Motion for Summary Judgment holding that the State was 
not Ewing's statutory employer at the time of the accident at issue. 
While granting the State's Motion for Summary Judgment under the Idaho recreational use 
statute, the court also denied the State's Motion for Summary Judgment under its statutory employer 
argument. In its Order of August 14, 2007, the court opined: 
The State of Idaho, Department of Transportation could qualify, in different 
circumstances, as a category 1 statutory employer of Plaintiff John Ewing pursuant 
to Idaho Code§ 72-223(1), but is not a statutory employer entitled to immunity due 
to the circumstances of the accident at issue and the nature of the employment 
relationship. R. p. l 04. 
Based on the undisputed facts in the record as set forth in Section II of this brief and pursuant 
to previous holdings of this Court, the lower court clearly erred in denying the State's motion that 
is a category 1 statutory employer of the Plaintiff and is thus, precluded from civil liability under the 
exclusive remedy rule of the Idaho worker's compensation law. The analysis the State has offered 
to the trial court that it is the statutory employer of Ewing is unequivocally accurate based on the 
applicable statutes, prevailing case law and the undisputed facts of this case. 
The Idaho Workers Compensation Act (Act), provides employees with a definite remedy for 
injuries arising out of and in the course of employment while limiting the liability of employers, 
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resulting in the exclusive remedy rule. See I.C. §§72-201,1 72-209(1 )2 & 72-211.3 There is a limited 
exception to the exclusive remedy rule which does not preclude an individual from bringing a civil 
action for damages against a third party; however, the Act specifically excludes certain employers, 
referred to as statutory employers, from third party liability. See I.C. §72-223.4 Three relatively 
recent cases set forth the framework for determining whether a third party is a statutory employer: 
Venters v. Sorrento Delaware, Inc., 141 Idaho 245, 180 P.3d 392 (2005); Robison v. Bateman-Hall, 
Inc., 139 Idaho 207, 76 P.3d 951 (2003); and Fuhriman v. State, Dept. ofTransp., 143 Idaho 800, 
153 P.3d 480 (2007). 
1"[S]ure and certain relief for injured workmen and their families and dependents is 
hereby provided regardless of questions of fault and to the exclusion of every other remedy, 
proceeding or compensation, except as is otherwise provided in this act." I.C. §72-201. 
2"Subject to the provisions of section 72-223, [Idaho Code] the liability of the employer 
under this law shall be exclusive and in place of all other liability of the employer to the 
employee, his spouse, dependents, heirs, legal representatives or assigns." I.C. §72-209(1). 
3"Subject to the provisions of section 72-223, [Idaho Code,] the rights and remedies 
herein granted to an employee on account of an injury or occupational disease for which he is 
entitled to compensation under this law shall exclude all other rights and remedies of the 
employee, his personal representatives, dependents or next of kin, at common law or otherwise, 
on account of such injury or disease." I.C. §72-211. 
4"The right to compensation under this law shall not be affected by the fact that the injury, 
occupational disease or death is caused under circumstances creating in some person other than 
the employer a legal liability to pay damages tl1erefor, such person so liable being referred to as 
the third party. Such third party shall not include those employers described in section 72-216, 
Idaho Code, having under them contractors or subcontractors who have in fact complied with the 
provisions of section 72-301, Idaho Code; nor include the owner or lessee of premises, or other 
person who is virtually the proprietor or operator of the business there carried on, but who, by 
reason of there being an independent contractor or for any other reason, is not the direct employer 
of the workmen there employed." LC. §72-223(1). 
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In Venters, the Court looked to the established statutory definition of"employer": 
'Employer' means any person who has expressly or impliedly hired or contracted the 
services of another. It includes contractors and subcontractors. It includes the owner 
or lessee of premises, or other person who is virtually the proprietor or operator of 
the business there carried on, but who, by reason of there being an independent 
contractor or for any other reason, is not the direct employer of the workers there 
employed. If the employer is secured, it means his surety so far as applicable. 
LC. §72-2-102(13)(a). The Venters Court also relied upon its previous interpretation of this 
definition in Robison, and determined that an entity can only qualify as occupying the status of 
statutory employer in one of two categories if it either: 
A. by contracting or subcontracting out services, is liable to pay 
worker's compensation benefits if the direct employer does not, or 
B. was the owner/lessee of the premises, or other person who is virtually 
the proprietor or operator of the business there carried on, but who by 
reason of there being an independent contractor or for any other 
reason, is not the direct employer of the worker. 
Venters, 141 Idaho at 249, 108 P.3d at 396; citing LC. §§72-216, -102, -223; Robison, 139 Idaho at 
210-211, 76 P.3d at 954-55 (emphasis added). Specifically with regard to the first category of 
statutory employer, the Venters court explained: 
Id. 
Thus, the definition of a statutory employer encompasses a party deemed an 
employer for the purposes of being liable for worker's compensation benefits under 
LC. §72-102, but who, by virtue of that liability, is also immune from third-party 
tort liability under LC. §72-223. 
The Venters case involved an injury and subsequent death of an employee of a trucking 
company that contracted with the defendant Sorrento of Delaware, Inc. ("Sorrento"). The plaintiffs 
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wife a11d child brought a wrongful death action against Sorrento and Sorrento sought summary 
judgment on the basis that it was the statutory employer of the trucking compa11y employee a11d was 
thus, immune from tort liability. The trial court agreed and the plaintiffs appealed. The Idaho 
Supreme Court focused its a11alysis on the first category of statutory employer outlined above, 
specifically whether Sorrento qualified as a statutory employer because of its contractual relationship 
with the trucking company. The Court recognized that the trucking compa11y provided worker's 
compensation for its injured worker but,"[ a]s a11 employer ofa contractor, Sorrento would not have 
been permitted to avoid liability to Mr. Venters under the Idaho worker's compensation statutes 
should [the trucking company] have failed to comply with the worker's compensation statutes." 
Venters, 141 Idaho at 250, 108 P.3d at 398. The contractual relationship between Sorrento a11d the 
trucking compa11y controlled and the Court held that Sorrento was the statutory employer of the 
direct employees of the trucking company, and therefore, "enjoyed the immunities provided by the 
Act from third-party tort liability." Id. This srune immunity is extended to employers who 
subcontract out services. LC. §72-216(1), (2).5 See also Robison, 139 Idaho at 211, 76 P.3d at 955. 
A similar analysis was done by the Court in Fuhriman, supra, which involved the death and 
injury of several persons who were all employees of Multiple Concrete Enterprises, Inc. 
("Multiple"), a contractor that was hired by ITD on a road construction project. Fuhriman, 143 
5"An employer subject to the provisions of this law shall be liable for compensation to fil1 
employee of a contractor or subcontractor under him who has not complied with the provisions 
of section 72-30 I [,Idaho Code,) in a11y case where such employer would have been liable for 
compensation if such employee had been working directly for such employer." I. C. §72-216(1). 
"The contractor or subcontractor shall also be liable for such compensation, but the 
employee shall not recover compensation for the srune injury from more than one party." I. C. 
§72-216(2). 
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Idaho at 802, 153 P.3d at 482. In that case the injured road workers and families ofroad workers 
injured and killed in an accident at the road construction site brought personal injury and wrongful 
death actions against ITD. Id. ITD owned and maintained the interstate where the accident 
occurred. Id. The Court was asked to determine whether ITD qualified as a category one statutory 
employer.6 Relying on the Act, Venters and Robison, the Court stated that it had "summarized the 
LC. §72-223 category one protection for employers as including 'employers who make use of a 
contractor's or subcontractor's employees.'" Fuhriman, 153 P.3d at 485 (citations omitted) 
( emphasis added). In Fuhriman ITD had a contractual relationship with Multiple, the employer of 
the injured workers, therefore, the Court concluded "[s]ince [ITD] 'expressly ... contracted the 
services' of Multiple, it meets the definition of statutory employer. ... In short, [ITD] made use of 
a contractor's employees by using them to render the services Multiple contracted to provide. 
Therefore, the State as an employer is immune from third party liability." Id. (footnote omitted). 
Another case that is instructive on the law regarding statutory employers is Struhs v. 
Protection Technologies, Inc., 133 Idaho 715,992 P.2d 164 (1999), in which the Court considered 
whether the Army was the statutory employer of the plaintiff, Struhs, who was working for a 
subcontractor hired through an entity contracting with the Department of Energy (DOE) for work 
at Idal10 National Engineering Laboratory (INEL, now INEEL ). The Court found that "[t]he DOE, 
which indirectly employed Struhs through its contracts with EG&G [the prime contractor], and the 
6 A "category one statutory employer" as that term is used in the Fuhriman case refers to 
the first category of employers as outlined above, i.e., an entity that, by contracting or 
subcontracting out services, is liable to pay worker's compensation benefits if the direct 
employer does not. 
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subcontract with APS [Struhs' direct employer], was Struhs' statutory employer." Id. at 720, 992 
P .2d at 169. In other words, the Court focused on the department of the United States that contracted 
for the work, rather than an unrelated department or agency of the United States. Id. 
Applying the Court's analyses and the framework in these cases to the facts of the instant 
matter leads to the conclusion that ITD is the statutory employer of the plaintiff and is therefore 
immune from liability. It is undisputed that a contractual relationship existed between ITD and 
Scarsella and further that Scarsella identified in its contract with ITD that it would subcontract with 
North Star. R. p. 66. Just as in Venters and Fuhriman, ITD was, in essence, making use of North 
Star's employees by using them to render services including flagging and pilot car operation, which 
Scarsella contracted to provide for the project. Just as in Struhs, ITD indirectly employed the 
plaintiff through its contract with Scarsella and the subcontract with North Star. It is also undisputed 
and evidenced by his worker's compensation claim, that Ewing was an employee of North Star at 
the time of his accident and that he was within the course and scope of his employment when the 
accident occurred. ITD was clearly a category one statutory employer of the plaintiff and is therefore 
immune from liability in tort. No genuine issue of material fact exists on this point. 
At the District Court level, Ewing moved for partial summary judgment seeking to preclude 
ITD from asserting its immunity as a statutory employer of the plaintiff. The basis for the motion 
was that he was not performing flagging duties at the time of his fall and that ITD was merely the 
owner of the property where he fell. Ewing completely ignored the fact that he was within the course 
and scope of his employment at the time of his fall, his indirect employment relationship with ITD, 
and the fact that his fall occurred within the construction zone of the project. 
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Ewing was taking a break from his flagging duties on the ITD project on Highway 95 when 
he fell on the grounds of the Mineral Mountain Rest Area. While construction on the rest area itself 
was not part of the project, the rest area is located at mile post 371, clearly within the construction 
zone of the project which stretched from mile post 366.593 to mile post 373.027 and was clearly 
within the scope of the contract. R. p. 89. Ewing argued at the trial court level that because he was 
not engaged in his duties on the project at the time of his fall, ITD's status as his statutory employer 
changes into the mere owner of the premises. 7 To support this flawed premise, Plaintiff relies on 
Robison, supra, and contends without analysis that Fuhriman, supra is "very different" than the facts 
of the instant matter. A true measuring stick on this issue is whether the State would have been 
called upon to provide worker's compensation benefits to Ewing for this incident, had either North 
Star or Scarsella failed to do so. The answer is clearly yes. 
An entity can qualify as a statutory employer ifitmeets one of the two criteria; it need not 
meet both. The relationships in this case are undisputed; ITD was an indirect employer of Ewing 
at the time of his fall, thus qualifying it as his statutory employer and limiting the Appellant to 
worker's compensation benefits as his exclusive remedy. Neither the circumstances of the accident, 
nor the nature of the employment relationship, the basis of the trial court's denial of the State's 
Motion on this issue, overcome the undisputed evidence that the State was Ewing's statutory 
employer at the time he fell at Mineral Mountain Rest Area. 
'Ewing aclmowledged ITD's status as his statutory employer in his brief, stating "any 
accident happening within the highway system in Idaho suffered by any person that is an 
employee of a contractor or subcontractor on the highway project involved is disqualified from 
bringing a lawsuit [pursuant to LC. §72-223]. With this general contention Plaintiff concurs." R. 
p. 30. 
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V. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the above undisputed facts, the cited case law and applicable statutes, and the 
reasons set forth above, Respondent/Cross-Appellant State ofidaho, Department of Transportation 
respectfully submit that the District Court's order granting summary judgment pursuant to Idaho 
Code§ 36-1604 be affirmed and that the District Court's order denying the State's motion for 
summaiy judgment that the State is a category 1 statutory employer of the Plaintiff and thus, immune 
from liability, be reversed. 
DATED this.2Vday of March, 2008. 
Attorneys for Resp ndent/Cross-Appellant 
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